O'CALLAGHON vs. RIGGS.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Michigan, June Term, 1856.
DANIEL O'CALLAGHON, CLAIMANT Vs. JOSEPH RIGGS.
1. A maritime lien on a vessel is paramount to a domestic lien, under a statute of
. State, of subsequent date.
And if a judgment and sale take place under the
statutory lien, it will not displace or affect the prior lien.
2. The vessel in the hands of such purchaser is subject to the prior lien.
8. As the liens set up are distinct, the plaintiffs being different, neither of these
suits can be pleaded in abatement to the-other.
4. Neither claimed the vessel, but a lien on it.
5. The purchaser under the statute lien, could not object to the jurisdiction of the
admiralty court-'as the suits and rights of the parties are distinct.

Alfred Russell, for libellant.
Simon Towle, for appellant.
MCLEAN, J.-Ths is an appeal in admiralty. Riggs, a citizen
of Michigan, filed his libel June.25th, 1855, for supplies furnished
the schooner John Richards, in a home port. Among other intervening libellants,'J. Braymon, a citizen of Ohio, a material-man,
filed his libel in the District Court, September 8th, 1855. The
marshal seized the vessel and made the usual return, "held in custody until the further order of the court." No person interposed a
claim. Proclamation was made, order of reference, &c., and the
vessel was condemned and sold the 24th of December, and the
claimant became the purchaser.
The respondent's title is set up under a bill of sale from the
sheriff of the county of Wayne. This sale was founded on a procedure of a Circuit Court commissioner under the 122d chapter of the
Revised Statutes of Michigan, of 1846, for the enforcement of a
lien on the vessel for repairs, &c., at the home port. The lien under
which the libel was filed, was prior to that at the home port, and
was incurred at Toledo, in the State of Ohio, which was a foreign
port, in a procedure of the admiralty.
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The vessel was seized by the sheriff before it was taken into custody by the marshal, of which the marshal had no notice, and the
sale of it by the sheriff was prior in time to the sale of the marshal,
both being made on the 24th of December, 1855.
A question was made and argued at the hearing, as to the admissibility of certain papers, to show the procedure before the commissioner. If the proceeding of the commissioner was legally a
matter of record, the proof would be defective; but from the view I
take of the case, it is unnecessary to decide this question.
The first section of the act gives a lien against all vessels which
navigate the waters of the State, for supplies, repairs, &c. After
the seizure of the vessel, twelve weeks' notice is to be given, and all
persons who have any demands against such vessel, "under the
provisions of this chapter are required to deliver an account of their
respective claims, to the officer within three months from the publication of notice, and sny lien, under the statute, if not presented
within the.time, ceases.
This proceeding is in the nature of an attachment, in which all
the creditors under the act, may come in and prove their debts;
and if bond and security shall be given to pay the creditors, the
vessel shall be released. The 7th"section of the act declares, that
a second warrant shall not issue against the same vessel. The 36th
section provides, that the procedure shall not be- instituted against
any vessel which has been seized undet process of the courts of the
United States, nor againgt any vessel which has been sold by-order
of such courts' except claims which originated subsequent to such
sale."
That there is under the maritime law, a lien on the ship for materials furiiished or repairs, is too well established to be controverted.
And that this lien does not depend upon the'possession of the vessel, as a common law lien, is also clear. In the case of the Gene) al
Smith, 4 Wheat. 443, Curtis, 440, the court held that, this lien did
not attach to the home port of the vessel. This was a distinction
not found in the maritime code, and was no doubt adopted from
deference to State regulations. Still a domestic lien at the home
port of the vessel, may be enforced under a maritime jurisdiction.
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It is conceded in the case, that the lien of the libellant was
prior to the lien of the respondent, under the Michigan statute.
But as the property was *firstseized under the statute, it is contended that the subsequent seizure by the marshal was illegal, and
consequently that the District Court had no jurisdiction of the
case.
No procedure under the statute of seizure or sale, could affect the
lien of the libellant. The claim of the respondents was distinct from
that of the libellants. The sale of the sheriff was subject to the prior
lien. In the hands of the purchaser under the sheriff, the vessel
was liable to the claimant, and he could have enforced his lien.
The statute provides that all claimants may come in, as under an
attachment, and have their rights adjusted. But this is limited to
claims under the statute, and did not embrace the claim of the libellant. All liens under the statute, which are not presented are barred
expressly by it. No one, it is* supposed, will contend that the
statute embraces a maritime lien; or that the legislature had power to
regulate such a lien. The rule is different in a court of admiralty.
All who have an interest in the vessel may come in and be'made parties and their rights will be protected. In the present case, the
respondent could have exhibited his claim, and it would have been
decreed, subject to the satisfaction of the prior lien. But the respondent did not intervene, though he had actual notice of the admiralty procedure. He stands upon his purchase under the sheriff's
sale, which did not displace the lien of the claimant. Such sale
was no bar to the libel suit, and consequently the title of the respondent is unsustainable against that of the libellant.
The force of the respondent's right must rest on the alleged illegality of the procedure by the marshal. The principlp is admitted,
that where there is a concurrent jurisdiction, the pendency of the suit
may be pleaded in abatement in the suit subsequently commenced.
But in these cases there is no conflict ofjurisdiction. The suits are distinct, by different plaintiffs, and for distinct causes of action. The
only thing common to both actions is, a lien of each on the same
vessel. But here there is no conflict, as all must admit that the
prior lien must be first satisfied; and that the claimant by the first
lien is not disputed.
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No impropriety is perceived in the arrangement between the
marshal and the sheriff, to hold the property, under the circumstances, subject to the right of the parties. Neither party claimed
the vessel, but an interest in it, which was a mere. lien, and the
only question is, whether the maritime court had jurisdiction. If
it had, there is an end to the controversy, as it proceeded on the
paramount lien. There is nothing on the face of the record to
raise a doubt as to the jurisdiction. No plea was filed to the jurisdiction, and the facts stated on the record show affirmatively, that
there was jurisdiction. In such a case, the truth of the record cannot be questioned, nor its irregularity.
The decree of the District Court is affirmed, with costs.

In the District Court of the United States for the District of
Missouri.-September, 1856.
HILL & CONN AND OTHERS vs. THE GOLDEN GATE.
1. It is settled that there can be no lien by the general maritime law for materials
and supplies furnished a vessel in her home port.
2. The question whether a vessel is a foreign or domestic one depends not on her
enrollment, but upon the residence of her owners.
8. Where there is a charter-party, the charterers having exclusive control of the
vessel will be deemed the owners and alone are responsible for damages and
contracts.

The opinion of the court, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
WELLS, J.-The steamer Golden Gate was owned in Indiana, and
enrolled at Louisville, Kentucky.
The owners chartered her to certain persons who resided at St.
Louis, Missouri.
By the terms of the charter-party the charterers were to have
the boat for four months, with a privilege to renew the charter
party, upon a specified. notice, for four months more. The charterers were to pay the owners $800 per month for the hire of the
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boat, and were to bave the entire and exclusive control and management of her for the time specified-were to receive her earnings,
and keep her clear of all liens and claims. The charterers appointed
the master, ran the boat, and during the charter-party contracted
debts in Missouri for materials and supplies, a part of which were
furnished by the libellants, and are the same for which the libels in
this case are filed. Other libellants furnished materials and supplies
before the boat was chartered.
The principal question for the court now to examine and decide
is, have the libellants in this case a lien upon the boat by the general
maritime law of the United States for the materials and supplies
thus furnished ?
* If materials and supplies be furnished to a vessel in a port of the
State to which she belongs, material-men have no lien by the general
maritime law-the presumption being that the supplies are furnished
on the credit of the owners, and not on that of the boat. On the
contrary, if the materials and supplies be furnished to a foreign
vessel, that is a vessel'belonging to a foreign country or to another
State, then a lien is given on the vessel by the general maritime
law-the presumption being that the material-men looked to the
vessel as well as to the owners for security. There may be a lien
on a vessel for materials and supplies furnished in a port of the
State to which she belongs, but in such case it is given by the local
law of the State. 1 Conkling's Ad. 56, and pages following. In
regard to these principles there is no controversy.
The question whether the Golden Gate is subject to a lien by the
general maritime law for supplies furnished in St. Louisi after the
charter-party was entered into, will depend for an answer on her
being then in a foreign or domestic port. Does h~r being a foreign
or domestic vessel depend on the residence of her owners, or on the
port of her enrollment P
As a general rule-which general rule, however, is subject to
some modifications and exceptions-it depends on the residence of
her owners-or those who are, for the time, to be deemed and
treated as her owners.
If it depends on the residence of her owners, then the next ques-
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tion will be, who are to be deemed and treated as her owners in
this case? Are they the general owners residing in the State of
Indiana, or the charterers residing in St. Louis, Mo.

That the Supreme and Circuit Courts of the United States look
to the residence of the owners and not to the place'of enrollment of
a vessel, to determine her character, will be apparent by examining
the decided cases. The residence of the owners is proved and
stated, and nothing is said about the enrollment. See the statement
of the case and opinion in The General Smit -- 4 Wheat. R. 438.
The brig Nestor, 1 Sumner's Rep. 75, where Judge Story says:'
"Prima facie the supplies of material-men to a foreign ship, that
is to a ship belonging or represented to belong to owners residing
in another State or country, are to be dedmed to be furnished on
the credit of the ship and the owners until the contrary is proved."
Statement of the case and opinion in The barque Chusan, 2"
1
Story's Rep. 456.
If the character of the vessel, (foreign or domestic,) depended on
the enrollment and not on the residence of 'the owners, the statements and proof of the residence of owners, -and the language of
Judge Story in the case of The brig Nestor, were idle and unimportant, and as nothing was said or proved about the enrollment,
there could -be nothing by which to determine the character of the
vessel.
It is important to observe that the -character of the vessel is only
referred to for the purpose of ascertaining to whom and to what the
credit is given; and in no other respect, so far as regards this cse,
is it important. If the owners reside in a foreign -country or in
another State, the material-man is presumed to give credit to the
boat and also to the owners-because; he is presumed not to relyalone on the owners who live so remote and who are beyond.:the
jurisdiction of the courts of his State. If the owners reside in the
same State with the material-man, the latter can easily resort to
them for payment and readily.enforce it in the courts; therefore
he may well be supposed to give credit to the owners alone.
It is apparent, therefore, that the place of enrollment has nothing
to do with the credit that is given; and has, therefore, nothing to
do with the question of lien.
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If the material-men were ignorant of the place of residence of the
owners, they might presume, and I think the presumption would be
reasonable, that the owners resided at or near the port where the
vessel was enrolled, but in this case there is no room for "presumption, as it is admitted that the libellants knew when the supplies
were furnished, that the general owners resided in Indiana, and the
charterers in St. Louis, and that the boat was enrolled at Louisville.
I I am aware of the case of .Frde vs. The Indiana, (Crabbe, 479.)
and that it decides that a vessel is to be deemed to belong to the
port where she is enrolled. It is founded solely on the third section
of the act of 31st December, 1792, entitled "an act concerning the
registering and recording of ships or vessels," (1 Lit. & B. Laws U.
S., 288.) That section provides "That every ship or vessel hereafter to be registered, (except as hereinafter provided,) shall be
registered by the collector of the district in which shall be comprehended the port to which such ship or vessel shall belong at thetime of her registration, which port shall be deemed to be that at ornearest to which the owner, if there be but one, or if more than one.
the husband or acting and managing owner of such ship or vessel)
usually resides."
The substance of the section is that the vessel is to be registered
at the port to which she belongs; and for the purose of registrgr
the port to which she belongs shall be deemed to be that at which.
the owner resides, or the port nearest to which he resides. The
section is only directing at what port the vessel is to be registered,
and has no other effect. It frequently happens, as it happens in
this case, that the owners reside in one State, and the port nearest
to them is in another State-and this is especially the case on the
Ohio and Mississippi rivers, which divide States.
The above act relates to registering vessels-those engaged in.
foreign trade. But a subsequent act, (Feb. 18, 1793--1 Lit. & B.,
305, § 2.) providing for the enrollment of vessels, (those engaged in,
the coasting trade,) expressly provides that the place of abode of
the owners shall be stated in the enrollment.
According to the late and well considered case of -Dudley and
others vs. The 8teamboat Superior, (American Law Register for
10
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August, 1855,)' which reviews the above case in Crabbe, the place
of enrollment is only prima facie evidence of the port to which the
vessel belongs. See also Sharp vs. United Ins. Co., 14 Johns. R.,
201 ; and Leonard vs. Huntington, 15 Johns. R., 302.
It will be observed that when the port or place to which a vessel
belongs is spoken of, it always means the port or place where the
owners reside to whom the vessel belongs.

I have before remarked in this opinion, that the rule that a
foreign vessel was subject to a lien for supplies, and that a domestic
vessel was not thus subject, under the general maritime law, was
not without exceptions and modifications; but it will be seen that
those exceptions and modifications all show that the. lien depends
.on the residence, or supposed residence, of the owners, and not on
the place of enrollment.
Thus, if the owners of a domestic vessel held out their vessel as
a foreign vessel-that is, as belonging to persons residing in a
foreign country-they are precluded by their own act from denying
3her foreign character, when libelled by material-men; and there
swill be a lien for the supplies furnished enforced in the admiralty.
The St. Tago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. R. 416, 17.
Again. If an exclusive credit be given to the mater, there is
mo lien, although she be a foreign vessel. The brig Nestor, 1,
Sumner's Rep., 75.
Again. If the contract be made with the owners personally and
inot with the master, there is no lien-the presumption being that
the credit was given to the owners personally, and not on the credit
,of the vessel. The.t. Jago de Cuba, supra.
The act of Congress of the.3d of March, 1851, (9 Lit. & B. 635)
-entitled, "An act to limit the liability of ship owners and for other
purposes," section 5 provides, "That the charterer or charterers of
-any ship or vessel, in case he or they shall man, victual and navigate such vessel at his or their own expense, or by his or their own
procurement, shall be deemed the owner or owners of such vessel,
within the meaning of.this act; and such ship or vessel, when so
-chartered shall be liable in the same manner as if navigated by the
,owner or owners thereof."
Volume ill page 622.
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The above section- applies, I presume, only to certain losses and
injuries specified in the act, and moreover is declared not to apply
to inland or river navigation; the last, as I suppose, was because
the general maritime law of the United States was not at that time
(March, 1851) thought to apply to the inland navigation, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring it to
extend to inland navigation, not having, at that time been made.
But it applies in many cases, and to all navigation except the inland
navigation; and shows that the place of enrollment can have nothing
to do with it. And so far as the act provides, it shows the opinion
of Congress that the charterers are to be, and ought to be considered
the owners.
Having established, as I think, the proposition that the lien in
favor of material-men under the general maritime law depends on
the residence of the owners, and not on the place of enrollment, it
becomes necessary to inquire who, in this case, are to be deemed
the owners.
The law, I think, is perfectly well settled, that where there is a
charter party, and by its terms the charterers, as in this case, are
to have exclusive possession, control and management of the vessel
during the term specified-are to appoint the master, run the vessel,
and receive the entire profits, they, and not the general owners, are
to be deemed the owners, and are alone responsible for damages and
contracts. Gracie vs. Palmer,8 Wheaton's R., 6383; Macardier
vs. The Chesapeake Ins. Co., 8 Cranch's R., 89; Abbott on Shipping, note 1 to page 57 of the English edition, and cases there
cited; Ibid, 288-9, same paging and note; The schooner Volunteer
and cargo, 1 Sumner's Reports, 566-7; Kleine vs. Catara, 2
Gallison's Rep., 75.
Indeed, upon principle as well as authority, there cannot be a
doubt. It might as well be contended that if you hire your horse
to another to perform a journey, you, and not he would be responsible for his shoeing and food.
It was said in the argument of this cause, that the charter-party
was not recorded. This can make no difference, as the only effect
of recording would be to give notice of its existence-there being
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no act of Congress declaring it to be void for want of recording
and the material-men expressly admitting that they knew of the
charter-party when they furnished the -supplies. Abbott on Shipping, page 33, of English ed., and note 1 to that page, and cases
there cited. There is an act of Congress, (9 Lit. & B., 440) entitled
"An act to provide for Recording the Conveyances of Vessels, and
for other purposes." But it does not extend to charter-parties;
and the instruments which the act requires to be recorded, are not
declared invalid as to those having.actual notice thereof.
I come, therefore, to the conclusion, that for supplies furnished
the Golden Gate at St. Louis, after she was chartered, the materialmen and the charteiers both residing there at the time, there is no
lien upon the vessel by the general maritime laws of the United
States.

In the District Court of the United tates, for the District of
Misaouri-S'qptember,1856.
ASHBROOK AND OTHERS VS. THE GOLDEN GATE.
1. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction in all civil causes of admiralty
jurisdiction and have it exclusive of the courts of the several States, except as to
the common law remedy.
2. A lien given by the general maritime law is a vested right, and the legislature of
a State can pass no law to impair it.8. A material-man who has a lien under the general maritime law of the United
States has a right to enforce that lien in the Federal courts, and State laws, or
proceedings under them, cannot deprive him of that right.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
WELLS, J.-In this case certain of the libellants had liens under
the general maritime law of the United Statbs; and others had
liens under the statute of Missouri, entitled "an Act concerning
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boats and vessels," (Digest Laws of Missouri, 1845, page 180.)
Those having liens under the general maritime law, furnished supplies in Cincinnatti, Ohio, where they resided at the time, and whilst
the boat was owned in Missouri; others resided in Missouri, and
furnished supplies whilst the boat was owned in Ohio.
Those having liens under the State law, resided in Missouri and
furnished the supplies there, the boat at that time being also owned
in Missouri.
After the supplies were furnished, the boat was sold under the
provisions of the above cited statute of Missouri; and the question
now raised for the consideration of the court is, were these materialmen divested of their several liens by not intervening in the State
Court, or by the proceedings in the State Court ? It is a question
of delicacy, as the decision of it may conflict with State laws; but
I am compelled to decide it.
The provisions of the statute of Missouri make no distinction in
terms between vessels owned by citizens or subjects of foreign nations, or citizens of other States of the Union, and those owned by
citizens of Missouri.
They apply to "every boat or vessel navigating the waters of
this State." See the act, section 1, and to "contracts made within
this State with boats used in navigating the waters of this State."
See the case of James, respondent vs. The Steamboat Pawnee, 19
Missouri Rep. 517.
If I understand correctly the language of Judge Story, he entertained the opinion that similar provisions in the statutes of the State
of New York, could not properly be construed to apply to any but
domestic boats or vessels-that is, those owned in New York. (The
Barque Chusan, 2 Story's Rep. 461-2.) But the Supreme Court
of Missouri makes no distinction between foreign and domestic
vessels.

(James vs. The Pawnee, supra.)

The case now under consideration differs from that of The Henrietta, decided by this court at the March term, 1856. In that
case the boat was owned in Missouri, and the supplies were furnished in Illinois. I held that the case did not come within the
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provisions of the steamboat law of Missouri, because the vessel was
hot, at the time the contract was made for the supplies, "navigating
the waters of this State ;" nor was the contract made or supplies
furnished "within this State," and, therefore, the lien obtained in
Illinois under the general maritime law, was not divested by the
sale in Missouri. But much of the reasoning in that case is applicable to this case, and will not be here repeated.
Is the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in rem, exclusively
in the United States courts ? When I wrote the opinion in the case
of the Henrietta, I had never known it questioned; but in a recent
decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio, it is questioned and denied.
(See Thompson vs. Steamer G. D. Morton, 2 Warden's Ohio State
Reports, 26.) That court appears to think that the provisions of
the 9th section of the judiciary act (of Congress) makes the jurisdiction of the District Courts exclusive only as relates to the Circuit
Courts of the United States. In that opinion I cannot concur.
The 9th section of the judiciary act (1789) declares that the
District Courts of the United States shall have, in certain cases
specified, 1st: Jurisdiction (or cognizance) exclusive of the courts
of the several States. 2d: In other cases, jurisdiction concurrent
with the courts of the several States, or the Circuit Courts of the
United States, as the case may be. 3d: And in other cases, exclusive original cognizance, without mentioning any other courts,
either Federal or State; and this last includes all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including certain seizures on
water, "saving to suitors, in all cases, a common law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it ;" and a like cognizance in
other cases of seizure without any saving.
In the first class of cases (as I have arranged them) the jurisdiction is not declared to be exclusive except as to the State Courts;
and there is, therefore, an implied exception as to the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Courts of the United States.
In the second class, the grant is not declared to be exclusive, but
concurrent, and the jurisdiction both of the courts of the several
States and the Circuit Courts of the United States is excepted.
In the third class there is no exception of the exclusiveness as to
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either the courts of the several States or the Circuit Courts of the
United States, except as to the common law remedy in the first
branch of that class, and without that exception as to the other
branch.
So that, in the third class, which includes the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, there is no exception except that of the common
law remedy, as to the exclusiveness of the original jurisdiction in
the District Courts. It is absolute, unconditional and exclusive.
But the grant of exclusive originaljurisdiction to the District Courts,
does not exclude the appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts,
which is also provided for in the 21st section of the, same act. This
seems to me conclusive.
Again. As to all other matters mentioned in the third class,
there never has been any doubt as to the jurisdiction being exclusive
as to the State Courts. Why then is it not exclusive as to the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction? The same language is used
as to all.
The Supreme Court of the United States, (Judge Marshall delivering the opinion) in the case of Slocum vs. Mayberry, 2 Whea. 9,
expressly decided that the jurisdiction of the United States courts,
as to seizures on land and water, is exclusive of the courts of the
several States; this is embraced in the second branch of the third
class above. Ia the case of aalston vs. Hoyt, 3 Whea. 246, the
question in the Supreme Court of the United States is put beyond
all dispute. The court is discussing the question of the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States courts, as it regards the State
courts, and declares that, '"By the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 9, the District Court are invested with exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and
of all seizures on land and water, and of all suits for penalties and
forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States."
Similar phraseology is used in the 11th section -of the judiciary
act, which gives the Circuit Court "exclusive cognizance of all
crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United
States, except where "this act otherwise provides or the laws of
tha United States shall otherwise direct"-without mentioning the
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State courts; yet no one has ever doubted that the jurisdiction here
given, was exclusive of the State courts. See also 1 Conkling's Ad.
349.
The opinion, (excepting so much as regards the effect of the 9th
section of the judiciary act) given by the Supreme Court of the
State of Ohio in the case above cited-and the opinion expressed
by that court in the case of Keating vs. Spaik, 8 Warden & Smith's
Ohio Rep., do not apply to the case I am considering, although
they deny exclusive jurisdiction in rem to the United States courts
in admiralty causes. The cases in which those opinions were delivered, arose and had to be decided under the act of Cougress of
the 26th of February, 1845, 5 Lit. and B. 726, which applies only
to the lakes and their connecting rivers, and which not only saves
the common law remedy, but also "any concurrent remedy which
may be given by the State laws."
1st.-Let us now see how the matter stands. The courts of the
United States have cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, and have it exclusive of the coufts of the
several States, except as to the.common law remedy.
2d.-This is a civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
3d.-The libellant has a lien given by the general maritime law
of the United States; it is as much a vested right as that of a mortgage. It is a contract which the legislature of a State can pass no
law to impair. Bronson vs. Kinzie, 1 How.311.
4th.-The party having this lien is entitled to sue in the United
States court in admiralty, to enforce it. This right is given by
the laws of the United States.
5th.-The laws of the United States are supreme over State
laws.
6th.-A State law comes in and declares that the party having
this lien shall either sue in the State courts (under the "act concerning boats and vessels,") or lose his lien.
Can it be possible such State law is valid ? The United States
law and the State law cannot both be enforced. The first gives the
party a right to sue in the United States courts and there to establish his claim and obtain the enforcement of his lien ; the second
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declares that if he does not sue in the State court-that is, if he
sues in the United States court, he shall get nothing.
I refer to the case of ,Shelbyvs. Bacon, et al, 9 How. 69, 70, 71,
to show that where a person has the right to sue in the courts of
the United States, no State law, and the proceedings of no State
tribunal can deprive him of that right. It is substantially as follows: The Bank of the United States, after obtaining a charter from
the State of Pennsylvania, failed: It made assignments of its assets
under the laws of that State. The assignees, according to those
laws, were to receive and collect the assets and allow debts and pay
creditors ; all under the control and jurisdiction of the Court of
Common Pleas of that State. If creditors did not exhibit their
claims and get them allowed, they obtained no part of the assets of
the bank.
A creditor who resided in Kentucky brought suit in the Circuit
Court of the United States. The assignees pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court. The case went to the Supreme Court of the
United States. That court held that the plaintiff, as a citizen of
another State, had a right to sue in the courts of the United States,
and the State law could not deprive him of that right. The court
says : "To establish this claim as against the assignees, the complainant has a right to sue in the Circuit Court (of the United
States,) which was established chiefly for the benefit of non-residents." " On the most liberal construction favorable to the exercise of the special jurisdiction, the rights of the plaintiff, in this respect, could not, against his consent, be drawn into it." "Citizens
residing, perhaps, in a majority of the States of the Union, are
debtors or creditors of the bank. It is difficult to perceive by what
mode of procedure the State of Pennsylvania can obtain and exercise an exclusive jurisdiction over the rights of persons thus situated."
It appears to me that if a person having a lien under the general
maritime law, cannot resort to this court-a court of exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty cases-because of the provisions of the State
laws and proceedings under them, then the whole subject is reversed, and the State courts have the exclusive jurisdiction; and in
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that way the entire jurisdiction, in all cases, of the courts of the
United States, might be absorbed by the State courts. I am speaking of the effect of such laws, not of the motives or intentions of the
legislature in passing them; for to do the legislature of Missouri
justice, the steamboat laws were enacted some sixteen years before
it was understood that the United States courts had jurisdiction of
cases arising out of our inland navigation upon the.public rivers of
the United States.
The act of Congress, section 9, above referred to, saves to suitors the right of a common law remedy, when the common law is
competent to give it. It is a common law remedy, as distinguished
from a remedy in the Admiralty or in Chancery.
This common law remedy existed before the constitution and act
of 1789, and is, by the latter, saved, not given, 2 Brown's Civil
and Admiralty Laws, 111, 112.
But a common law remedy is a remedy by action at common ]aw,
and is not a proceeding in rem, or against the vessel itself. Thid,
and note 53 to page 111.
Courts of common law do not proceed in rem. Percival .vs.
Ilickey, 18 Johns. R. 292; Waring vs. Clarke, 5 How. R. 461
Clarke vs. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., 1 Story's R. 538-9;
1 Kent's Com. 378, (2d ed.) Opinion of Mr. Justice Caron in
Waring vs. Clarke, supra, and therefore a proceeding in rem
cannot be a common law remedy.
The common law is competent to give a remedy in many cases,
which are cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Thus a
material-man may proceed in.admiralty either against the vessel in
rem, or against the owners in personam, or against the master in
personam. He has also his remedy at common law, which would
be an action of debt or assumpsit against the owners-or a like
action against the master for the. value of the supplies furnished.
In some, if not all cases of collision, where a party injured could
maintain a suit in rem in the admiralty, he could also maintain an
ation of trespass at common law. -Percivalvs. Hickey, supra.
So an action of trover will lie in many cases of a wrongful dis-
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possession of vessels- although there is a remedy also in the
admiralty.
Why are suitors, not suing in the admiralty. but in the State
courts, limited to a common law remedy, and are not authorized to
proceed in rem?
The proceedings against ships and vessels affect the citizens and
subjects of foreign nations, as well as the citizens of the several
States; and it is important that the principles and rules for determining rights and injuries, and the courts to administer them should
be those known to the law of nations; and those principles and rules
should be uniform throughout the United States-so also of the
remedies.
If the courts and officers, including justices of the peace and
constables, of the several States, can proceed in rem, against the
vessels of other States, so they can against foreign ships and vessels
-and thus ships would be seized, voyages would be broken up, the
United States involved in difficulties and reclamations with foreign
nations; a multiplicity of laws, rules and proceedings, contradictory
and inconsistent with each other in the several States, be introduced;
and thus the exclusive right and jurisdiction of the United States
over our foreign relations, and over the commerce and navigation
of the United States, both foreign and domestic, would be interfered
with and rendered impracticable. And the States themselves would
soon get into conflicts of jurisdiction and laws, and resort to laws
retaliatory and vexatious upon the shipping of each other, as was
the case before the adoption of the federal constitution.
It must be remembered, also, that the navigable rivers of the
United States are not the exclusive property of any State or States,
but are common to all. Benedict's Ad. 114. And that vessels
navigating those rivers are enrolled and licensed by the United
States, and that such license imports full power and authority to
navigate them; and no other authority is necessary.
In relation to the authority of the U. S. Courts and the State
courts in admiralty cases, see The Spartan, Wares' Reps. 147;
Certain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumner's Rep. 502; Wall vs. The
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Royal Saxon, 2 Am. Law Reg. 324; 1 Haggard's Ad. R. 298;
The Floravs. The Globe, Am. Law Jour. for February, 1851.
I do not find any reported case in which is satisfactorily discussed
and decided the question how far, under the 9th section of the
Judiciary act, the courts of the several States have jurisdiction to
proceed in rem against ships and other vessels enrolled or registered
and licensed under the laws of the United States. I find cases
decided, which arose under the act of 1845, extending a QUASI
admiralty jurisdiction to the lakes and their connecting rivers;
which are, as already shown, not applicable to the commerce and
navigation on other rivers. Some other cases speak of a concurrent
remedy at common law, and say that the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States is not exclusive.
This is all true, because the common law remedies are saved; but
they do not discuss the legality of a proceeding in the State Courts
affected by the 9th section of the Judiciary
in rem, and how far it ,is
act.

It was said in the case of The ship Robert Fulton, (1 Paine's
Rep. 420) that under the law of New York, a somewhat similar
statute to that of Missouri, the State courts proceed in rem, and
have a concurrent jurisdiction. After a most careful, and I may
say, laborious investigation of the subject, I cannot discover on
what principle that opinion can be maintained. 'The court merely
says: ".That the State tribunals had authority also to enforce the
lien (given by the statute of New York) in the present case, is very
certain, free from the express provisions of the law (of New York.)
There was then, a concurrent jurisdiction in the two courts, and the
proceedings under the State authority were, -in the nature of proceedings, in rem."
Now, with the greatest' respect for the opinions of the learned
judge who delivered the above opinion, it appears to me that the
concurrent jurisdiction in rem of the United-States and State courts,
cannot depend on the statutes of the State, but on those of the
United States.
Let us examine carefully and critically the language used in the
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Constitution of the United States, and also that used in the 9th
section of the Judiciary act. It will aid us in the investigation.
The Constitution declares that "The Judicial power shall extend
to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The 9th
section of the act declares that "The District Courts of the United
States shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." "Saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it."
It has been said that, perhaps there has never been in the United
States a law more carefully and ably digested, than that of 1798.
In this opinion I fully concur. It has remained almost untouched
for sixty-seven years. It originated in the Senate, which then
possessed men of eminent ability, several of whom were distinguished
members of the Federal Convention. Oliver Ellsworth, afterwards
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was
chairman of the committee to whom the subject was referred, and
who is said to have prepared the bill.
Observe, the only exception to the exclusive cognizance is, not a
remedy in the common law courts, but a common law remedy. The
remedy is to be the common law remedy, no matter in what State
Court it may be sought, or what may be the system under which
the court may proceed. There is also a qualification of this saving
of a common law remedy. It can be only in a case "where the
common law is competent to give it." This qualification was,
doubtless, intended to cut off new remedies which might be devised,
but which were unknown to the common law. For, if the common
law was not competent to give the remedy sought, then the party
could not resort to any other, but must sue in the United States
Court in Admiralty. A suitor cannot therefore say "a common
law remedy is saved to me, and if there be none to effect my object,
(the seizure of a vessel) I can use any the legislature may have
devised for my case."
What, then, is the common law remedy spoken of in the ninth
section ? In my judgment it can be only common law actionsactions of debt, assumpsit, case, trespass, trover, &c., as known
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and practiced at the common law. Such are the only common law
remedies then, or indeed now known; and these, in many cases, are
proper remedies and such as the common law is competent to give.
But a proceeding by bill in equity is unknown as a common law
remedy; and a proceeding in rem is unknown as a common law
remedy. What lawyer ever knew or heard of a proceeding in rem
as a common law remedy? Even the actions of detinue or replevin
have in them nothing of the nature of proceedings in rem. Each
requires a plaintiff and defendant who are persons, and the judgments bind no one but parties and privies. True, a proceeding in
rem may be used in common law courts of the States, but in all
such cases it is given by statute, or is a proceeding under the civil
law. And the fact that it is given by statute, and did not exist
before the statute which gave it, in States where the common law

prevails, shows that it had no existence as a remedy at the common
law. I do not speak of modifications and improvements of actions
at common law, which may doubtless be made by the Legislatures,
and still be within the meaning of the ninth section, but the proceeding in rem is given originally and entirely by statutes, where
it exists in common law courts, and is not merely modified and improved.
When a court has jurisdiction to proceed in rem, and does so proceed, its judgments are binding and conclusive on the whole world,
and this is so, whether the tribunal be foreign or domestic. The
Mary, 9 Cranch R., 126.
Not so with judgments at common law: they bind only parties
and privies.
If the State courts can have jurisdiction in admiralty cases,
conferred on them by State statutes, to proceed in rem, so they
can to proceed in equity, and this would constitute them to all intents and purposes, courts of admiralty; and this jurisdiction can
be, and in many cases is given by the State laws to justices of the
peace, and to constables as their ministerial officers. If there is
an average of fifty counties to each State, and twenty justices of
the peace to each county, we should then have in these United
States, thirty-one thousand courts of admiralty and maritime ju-
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risdiction, to say nothing of the courts of record. These courts
proceeding against and seizing and selling vessels of foreign nations, and those of sister States, and although they would have all the
powers of courts of admiralty, yet they would, in but few instances,
proceed according to the maritime law, which is part of the law of
nations, nor according to acts of Congress (for Congress can pass
no law regulating proceedings in the State courts ;) but they would
proceed according to the statutes of the several States, and usages
that would there prevail, each State having a different system.
The effect of this must be, it appears to me, to embroil the United
States with foreign nations, and the several States with each other,
and to produce retaliatory laws and proceedings, and endless conflict, uncertainty and mischief. And this, I repeat, would render
nugatory the provisions of the 9th section of the judiciary act of
1789; -and the power of Congress to regulate commerce and (navigation as incident thereto) with foreign nations and among the
several States. If I am right in the views above expressed,
there can be no concurrent jurisdiction in rem in admiralty cases
between the United States courts and the courts of the several
States.
I do not, however, consider the proceeding in the State courts of
Missouri against boats and vessels, as strictly a proceeding in rem.
It is, it appears to me, a proceeding devised for suing the owners;
but instead of using the name of the owner, it uses that of the
boat. In some cases, arising under the act, a judgment is rendered
against the boat for the demand of the plaintiff only, execution
thereupon issues, and only enough is collected to pay the plaintiff's
judgment and costs ; and there is consequently nothing to distribute
among other creditors or claimants. In no case can creditors, material-men, and others, although having valid liens, intervene and
have their claims adjudicated and get any part of the proceeds, unless the contract for supplies, &c., was made within this State, and
the boat at the time navigating, this State. James vs. The Pawnee,
19 Mo. R., 517. So I presume, it would be as to the other contracts, and as to injuries specified in the act. Such proceedings do
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not look much like proceedings in admiralty, or proceedings in rem.
See the opinion of this court in the case of ITh Benrietta.
Be this as it may, I could not give to those proceedings the effect
which is given to proceedings "strictlyin rem.
I am, therefore of opinion that the material-man who has a lien
under the general maritime law of the United States, has a right
to enforce that lien by a suit in the United States court ; and that
the State law and proceedings under it, given in evidence in this
case, do not deprive him of that right. The barque Chusan, 2
Story's Rep. 462; CertainLogs of Mahogany, 2 Sum. R. 592. But
how is it with the material-man who has no lien under the general
maritime law, but has a lien under the State law?
The subject is not without its difficulties; but I think that as the
lien is given by the State law, the State law may divest it. If he
takes under the State law, he must hold under the State law. He
takes his lien subject to 11 the provisions for divesting it contained
in State laws. passed anterior to his lien. He takes cum onere,
Bronson vs. Kenzie and another, 1 How. R. 811. The barque
Chusan, 2 Story's R. 462. The statute which gives the lien-and
which is the only law which gives him a lien-provides for certain
judicial proceedings by which the vessel may be sold and the lien
divested. The 13th section of the "act concerning boats and vessels" (Dig. Laws of Mo., 1845, page 188) declares that-" when
any boat or vessel shall be sold under the 11th section of this act,
the .pfficer making the sale shall execute to the purchaser a bill of
sale therefor, and such boat or vessel shall, in the hands of the purchaser and his assigns, be free and discharged from all previous
liens and claims under this act."
What the law gave, the law hath taken away. The libellant cannot complain, his lien is divested by the same law and the same
authority which gave it.
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-DistrictCourt for the City and County of Philadelphia,Oct., 1856.
FAIRGRIEVES VS. THE LEHIGH NAVIGATION COMPANY.
1. A partial assignment of a debt, not assented to by the debtor, will not bind the
latter at law or in equity, nor deprive him of the right to pay the whole to the
assignor, even after notice.
2. The salary of a clerk is not assignable before it is earned, in whole or in part.

This was a motion for judgment on a point reserved at the trial
of the case. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court,
which was delivered by
HARE, J.-This was an action of assumpsit, brought by James
Fairgrieves to the use of Susan Erwin, against the Lehigh Navigation Company. The defendants proved a payment in full to Fairgrieves, which was necessarily a bar to the action, unless the company
had been deprived of the right to make it by the following agreement between Fairgrieves and Mrs. Erwin, which was produced and
proved at the trial:
"I, the undersigned, agree that Mrs. Erwin shall draw from the
Lehigh Company fifteen dollars of my pay or salary, (or I to draw it,
and pay it to her,) on the tenth day of each month, until her debt
against me for rent for the house, N. E. corner of Union and
Third streets, is satisfied or paid-the first payment to be made 10th
of August, 1854.
J. FAIRGLIEVES."
Signed,
The question is, whether this instrument operated as an equitable.
Lssignment, and precluded the defendants from paying Fairgrieves,
ifter receiving a notice to the contrary from Mrs. Erwin. We are
',learly of opinion that it did not, first, because of the partial nature of the assignment, and next on account of the nature of the
interest assigned.
Although the authorities ire not quite consistent, with regard to
'he effect of a partial assignment of a chose in action, there are
iome points which admit of but little difference of opinion. It is
)lain, both on authority and principle, that an entire cause of action
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cannot be split or severed by the act of one party without the consent of the other, and that the powers of an assignee rise no higher
in this, or any other particular, than those of the assignor from
whom they flow. Hence however varied or numerous the interests
which may grow out of transactions between the creditor and third
persons, but one action can be brought against the debtor, and he
will retain the right to discharge the whole debt by a single payment, without regard to the new and perhaps complicated relations,
-which have been engrafted upon the simplicity of the original obli,gation. It is true that both law and equity permit and aid the
transfer of a cause of action from one hand to another, when assigned as a whole, and not in parcels or fragments, because this
merely shifts the right of the creditor, without varying or impairing
the position of the debtor, and simply compels .him to make payment to the assignee instead of the assignor. But the case is
widely different, when. a partial assignment seeks to charge the
-debtor with. the burden of ascertaining the respective shares or
equities of the assignor and assignee, and paying each the proportion due to him, at the risk of being made answerable for any
-mistake by the other. If this were permitted in cases like the
present, which are comparatively free from difficulty, it could not be
*refused in others of a different nature, where the obstacles might be
,great and perhaps insuperable. If a debt can be divided 'and thus
converted into two distinct obligations, it may equally well be cut
up into twenty, each possessed of distinct and separate vitality, and
-each conferring a right on the holder which would enable him to
demand an account and payment.
It was accordingly'held by the .Supreme Court of the United
States in Mandeville vs. Welch, 5 Wheaton, 279, and by that of
Massachusetts in Gibson vs. Clark, 20 Pick. 15, that a partial assignment of a debt will not bind -the debtor either in equity or law,
mor deprive him of the right to pay the whole to the assignor, after
notice that part has been transferred to the assignee.
A. note to the case of Morton vs. 2alylor, 1 Hill, 518, assumes
that a different rule prevails in New York, but the cases cited by
the annotator are limited to these two points : first, that the assign-
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ment of a larger demand as security for the payment of a smaller
transfers the whole debt, making the assignee a trustee for the surplus; and next, that the assignment of part of a debt may be
rendered valid by the concurrence or assent of the debtor. Both
these propositions are unquestionable; and it may be doubted whether
there is any case in English or American law which goes beyond
them. In Let vs. .AHorzis, 4 Simons, 607, an assignment by a contractor, of part of each of the instalments which were tb fall due
during the erection of a house which he had agreed to build, was
indeed held binding on the owner, notwithstanding its partial nature
and operation, but then he had assented to it by silence, if not by
action, on the one hand, and the assignee had supplied materials to
the contractor on the faith of it, on the other. The partial nature
of the transfer passed without comment either from the court or
counsel, and there are no means of determining whether the failure
to notice it arose from oversight, or from an opinion that it formed
no obstacle to the recovery of the complainant, and was not worthy
of being made the subject of attention. Were this decision more
nearly in point than it would seem to be, it could not weigh ir this
country against that of Mfandeville vs. Welch, which claims our
respect from the force of its reasoning, as well as from the high
position of the court which pronounced it. In all doubtful questions of general and commercial jurisprudence the State courts
should incline to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, from motives of comity and a desire to secure uniformity
of decision, as well as from a due regard to the unity and harmony
of our existence as a people. The American ins. Co. vs. insley, 7
Barr, 223. We have consequently no hesitation in deciding that
an assignment like the present, which attempts to divide an entire
cause of action, and thus create a multiplicity of demands out of a
single obligation, is not binding on the debtor, and will not deprive
him of the right to pay the debt into the hands of- the person with
whom it was originally contracted. But it may be proper to say,
that our decision is strictly limited to the effect of such transactions
on the rights of the debtor, and that we do not mean to deny that
the assignment of part of a debt may be binding, as between those
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who are parties to it, and may entitle the assignee to bring suit in
the name of the assignor against a defaulting debtor, because sucL
a course merely calls upon the latter to pay the debt, without making him responsible for the appropriation of the money after it is
paid. But this is obviously a very different thing from compelling
a debtor who is ready and willing to meet his obligations, to undergo
the risk and trouble of investigating transactions to which he is a
stranger, and incurring new responsibilities in the performnnce of
an act which ought to free him from all charge or liability. The
burden of the introduction of a stranger into the relation between
debtor and creditor, is sufficiently onerous, when the whole debt is
assigned, and would be intolerable if partial assignments were permitted.
Were this, however, less clear than it would, seem to be, there
would still remain a formidable objection to the title of the assignee,
growing out of the nature of the right assigned. This consisted in
the salary of the assignor, as clerk of the defendants, before it was
earned, and while it was yet a mere contingency depending on his
willingness to serve them, and theirs to employ and pay him. The
interest assigned was, therefore purely contingent, and depended
for its existence not only upon the will of the assignor, but on that
of the company, who might have discharged him from their employment, and thus rendered the claim of the assignee wholly nugatory.
The case of Lunn vs. Thornton, 1 0. B. 879 ; Gale vs. Burnell, 7 Q.
B. 850 ; and Winslow vs. The Merchants'Ins. Co., 4 Metcalf, 806,
establish that no grant or transfer can be good at law, unless the
right or title granted have some actual existence ; it need not be
vested in possession, or even in interest, but it must have a real
foundation in the past or present, and not depend wholly upon purpose or intention. On the other hand, Mitchell vs. Winslow 2 Story
680 ; Field vs. The Mayor of Arew York, 2 Selden, 179 ; Langdon
vs. Nlorton, 1 Hare, 549, and Calkins vs. Lockwood, 16 Con. 276,
seem to show what indeed can hardly be doubted, that a transfer
which fails as a gift or grant, for want of a present interest, may,
notwithstanding, be specifically enforced as an executory contract.
But however this may be, it is certain that the assistance of equity
in this, as in all other cases of specific performance, is discretionary,
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and will not be afforded unless the circumstances of the case are
such as to justify and demand it. This distinction pervades the
whole field of equitable jurisprudence, and separates it from that of
law where jurisdiction is imperative, and the ill use which may be
of a remedy, no excuse for withholding it.
The discretion of a chancellor is indeed controlled by precedent, and guided by maxims and principles; but it is not the less a
discretion. This is emphatically true when, as in the present instance, the aid of equity is invoked to overrule legal rights, in order
to give effect to interests which the law does not recognize. The
legal operation of the paper signed by the defendant, is at most
that of a draft or order; we are asked to convert it into an irrevocable transfer of the proceeds of his future labor. If the wages of
toil can be pledged before they are earned, for the payment of
debts, or for the purpose of obtaining credit; if the creditor can
step in and intercept them in their passage from the hand of the
employer to that of the workman, in what will the condition of the
debtor differ from that 6f a slave ? His life and limbs may still be
his own, but the right to use them for his own benefit will be at an
end, or subject to the control of another. It is true that the transfer now in question, is limited to what might be earned in the service
of a particular master. But if equity will sustain and enforce
such transactions in any case, it must be prepared to do so in all.
The assignment of wages earned in a specific service or employment,
may injure one party without benefiting the other, by inducing the
assignor to abandon a good situation and seek another less advantageous, but where what he makes will at least be his own. But an
assignment of all that the assignor may subsequently earn anywhere, would, at the worst, have the merit of giving the assignee a
security on which he might rely with some confidence, unless its
effect in depriving effort of its reward, and holding out a motive for
idleness, should induce the conclusion, that what destroys hope and
fetters exertion, must cause tQo much ill to be easily productive of
good.
No case has been cited which in any way sanctions the idea, that
equity will lend its assistance for such a purpose; while there are
many which tend to show that no man can be deprived of the right
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to devote the proceeds of his labor to his own support and that of
those dependent on him, either by his own act or by that of the law.
Thus it is well known that the assignment of a bankrupt, goes farther under the English statutes than any transfer which derives its
force wholly from his own act or agreement, and yet it is thoroughly
well settled, that although the assignees are entitled to every right
which accrues to the bankrupt subsequently, however remote or contingent, they cannot claim the fruits of his personal services, and
thus deprive him of the means of gaining a livelihood by the efforts
of industry or the exercise of skill. The point has been so held in
a series of cases, beginning with (Ihippendall vs. Tomlinson, 4 Douglass 318, and coming down to Wifliams vs. Chambers,10 Q. B. 337.
"It is," said Lord Mansfield, in Chippendal vs. Tomlinson, "a
question of terrible importance, for what is to become of the bankrupt if he cannot earn a maintenance -by his daily labor ?" The
question put by his lordship on that occasion may well be repeated
here, where we are asked to establish a precedent which would cer
tainly end in creating the evil which he deprecated. Want, which
is ever the parent of that indifference to the future, of which it is
generally the offspring, is always rea4y to sacrifice every thing to
the present, which can mitigate its demands and secure a temporary
exemption from suffering. What the plaintiff did in this case, under
its influence, others would do again in favor of creditorsless deserving
than Mrs. Erwin, and labor would be subjected to incumbrances
equally prejudicial to itself and to the community.
- The remarks which have been made, may suffice to show the consequences of sustaining such assignments to the parties, but it may
lie well to add a fewwords on the effect which it would have on
third persons, and the course of proceeding in which it would involve the courts. Nothing could be more useless than to hold an
assignment of future wages valid, and yet leave it to the choice of
the assignor whether the work shall be done, for this would be to
decide in favor of a right, and then make it dependent on the caprice
or. will of the personwho createdit. If such transfers are to be upheld and enforced, they must be treated as contracts between the
assignor and assignee, and compelled the assignor to do all that is
necessary to render them effectual.

The spirit, if not the letter of

COMMONWEALTH vs. FRAZEE.

an assignment of the salary of a clerk, or the wages of a laborer,
is that the person who executes it will go on and do the work, or
render the services, which are necessary to call the interest assigned
into being. Hence the intervention of equity to be really effectual
must go to the length of enforcing the performance of the task
which the assignor has impliedly promised to accomplish, and prohibiting its interruption, until the assignee has obtained full satisfaction. And even if such a decree were made and enforced, it might
still be frustrated by the refusal of the employer to permit the
work to be done or the services rendered. The difficulty, or rather
the impossibility of doing this, and the mischief which it would produce if done, are too plain for comment, and render further argunent superfluous. We do not think it necessary to pursue the
subject further, and enter judgment for the defendants on the
point reserved. Judgment for defendants.
In the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County-November, 1856.
COMMONWEALTH VS.

ANDREW B. FRAZEE.

1. A State may waive its right to exercise judicial authority over portions of its
territory.

2. By the agreement between the States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey made in
1783, the juridical investigation and determination of criminal offences committed
on the river Delaware are specially provided for, and is exclusive, no other court
having cognizance of such offences except as provided by this agreement and
subsequent Acts of Assembly.
3. A defendant cannot be called upon to answer two distinct tribunals for the same
offence.

TiioMPsoN, P. J.-The defendant, by his pleas, denies the right of
the Court of Oyer and Terminer of the county of Philadelphia, to
entertain jurisdiction of the offence charged in the indictment, for
the reason that prior to the commencement of the prosecution in
this county, he had been bebn arrested and prosecuted for the same
offence in the State of New Jersey, which said State had then the
exclusive jurisdiction over the offence alleged to have been committed
by him.
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The indictment contains three counts, to each of which the
defendant has put in a plea, differing from those pleaded to the
other counts, only in the manner of stating his arrest and prosecution in New Jersey.
The Commonwealth, by the District Attorney, demurred to the
several pleas, and, as by demurring, the truth of the facts stated in
the pleas is allowed, the only question presented for decision iswhether the defendant, having been arrested and prosecuted in
New Jersey, for the same offence charged in this indictment, and
before the arrest or prosecution of the defendant within this Commonwealth, can be again indicted in this court for the same offence ?
The facts relied on by the defendant in his pleas, and admitted by
the demurrer, areThat the alleged offence was committed on the river Delaware.
That by the agreement between the States of Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, ratified by the State of Pennsylvania on the 20th of
September, 1783, and by the State of New Jersey on the 27th
March, 1783, it was agreed and established that all capital and
other offences committed on the river Delaware, the juridical investigation and determination thereof should be exclusively vested in
the State wherein the offender or person charged with such offence
shall be first apprehended, arrested or prosecuted.
That by an act of her legislature, passed on the 14th day of
March, 1856, the State of New Jersey had committed the' investigation and determination of any capital, or other offence thereafter
committed up6n the river Delaware, under the agreement with the
State of Pennsylvania, to the courts and officers of the county of
said State of New Jersey, living and being nearest" to the place
where such-offence was committed.
That the county of Camden lies and is the county of the State
of New Jersey, nearest to the place upon the river Delaware,
where the alleged offence in the indictment, charged againd the
defendant (if any such offence there was), was committed:
And that the said defendant was arrested and prosecuted in the
said county of Camden, in the State of New Jersey, at a Court of
Oyer and Terminer held therein for the said county at the May term
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thereof, 1856, for the offence alleged in this indictment, and before
any arrest or prosecution took place within this State.
Upon this state of the facts, all of which are admitted by the
demurrer to be true, the defendant denies the present jurisdiction of
this court over the alleged offence.
This objection to the exercise of jurisdiction by this court is
properly taken by the pleas filed. Wherever an indictment is
found in a court having no cognizance of the offence, or where
exclusive jurisdiction is vested in another tribunal, by statute or
otherwise, the defendant may plead to the jurisdiction, without
answering to the alleged offence; 2 Hale, P. C. 286; 4 BI. Com.
883. He has the right to have the power of the court to try the
offence first determined.
That a State being sovireign, may waive or transfer its right to
exercise judicial authority over portions of its territory, cannot be
doubted. A State may sell or cede its own territory, with all its
powers over it, to another power, as in the case of the cession of
the District of Columbia to the United States, or in the sale to
Congress of places to be used as forts, dock yards, hospitals,- &c.
So, by the grants of municipal charters and of franchises, the legislature transfers power often of a judicial nature to corporate bodies.
The act of 1783, upon which the defendant relies, does not
assign or transfer to the State of New Jersey any power which the
State of Pennsylva.nia possessed over offences committed on the
river Delaware. It waives the exercise of such authority in certain
cases, and permits the adjoining State to try an offender arrested
within its limits for an offence committed upon the river, in order
to avoid a clash of jurisdiction which would necessarily arise from
the uncertainty of fixing the locality of the offence. The same act
takes care to provide for cases where this uncertainty cannot exist,
as where vessels are anchored before any city or town, or are
aground upon the shore of either State, that State retains the
exclusive jurisdiction over them. The binding effect of the agreement of 1783 has never been questioned, and the advantages arising
from it to each of the parties to it have often been recognized by
our courts. It has been often appealed to for the adjustment of
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differences between the two States. As between Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, (says Mr. Sergeant, in his celebrated decision in the
Pea PatchIsland case, p. 122) "this compact was formed upon great
deliberation and with the full knowledge of the subject, and is in
conformity with the principles afterwards laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Hfandley's Lessee vs.
Anthony," 5 Wheat. 375. Soon after the passage of the act of
September 20, 1783, this State, by the act of September 25, 1786,
the exercise of the jurisdiction allowed by the terms of provided for
the agreement, by extending the limits of the counties bordering on
the river Delaware to the shore of New Jersey.
The State of New Jersey, however, took no measures to vest the
jurisdiction over offences committed on the Delaware, in any of her
courts, until it was discovered by the decision of the Supreme Court
of that State, in the case of Ihe State vs. Bebecca Davis, reported
in 1 Dutcher, 483, which case occurred in 1855, that no court of
that State had jurisdiction over such offences. In consequence of
that decision, an act of the legislature of New Jersey was passed,
by .wichjurisdiction over offences committed on the river Delaware
was vested in the court of the county nearest to the place where
such offence should be committed; and it happened, rather remarkably, that the act thus vesting jurisdiction in the county courts of
the State of New Jersey, was approved and became a law on the
14th March, 1856, the very day previous to the time on which the
offence alleged in this indictment was committed.
It thus appears that at the time of the commission of the alleged
offence, a court of competent jurisdiction existed in the State of
New Jersey, to take cognizance of -the offence; and the facts
admitted by the demurrer show that the arrest and prosecution of
the defendant for the same offence took place in the county of
Camden, before any proceedings were had in this State. By the
arrest and apprehension of the defendant first in the State of New
Jersey, the court of that State, which by the laws of that State had
jurisdiction of the offence, became entitled under the agreement of
1783, to the exclusive "juridical investigation and determination" of
the same. No other court in this State could take cognizance of
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the offence. The defendant cannot be called upon to answer in two
distinct tribunals for the same offence. And where the jurisdiction
of a competent court has attached, no second prosecution can be
sustained. No man can be twice legally tried for the same offence.
On the part of the Commonwealth, no reason has been suggested
in opposition to what appears to be the necessary construction of
the several laws referred to, or to the effect of the facts as set out in
the defendant's pleas. It is difficult to understand what tenable
argument could be advanced.
For the reasons given, the demurrer must be overruled, and the
pleas to the jurisdiction of the court sustained.
Judgment was accordingly entered for the defendants in all the
,cases similarly situated.
St. C. T. Oampbell and J.
Bead, for defendant.
B
-DistrictAttorney lm. B. Reed, for demurrer.

In the Supreme Court of Alabama-JanuaryTerm, 1856.
BARLOW vS. LAMBERT.

1

I. Common law, how far in force in this State.-The common law of England, as
changed and modified by our statutes, is part and parcel of the law of this State,
so far as applicable to our institutions and government.
2. Evidence of custom, admissiilityof.-Evidence of a local custom is admissible, to
supply details in a contract, either oral or written, as to which the contract itself is silent; or to show that provincialisms, and technicalities of science and
commerce, have acquired a known, fixed, and definite meaning, different from
their ordinary import; or where such technicalities, unexplained, are susceptible
of two or more reasonable constructions: but it cannot be received to contravene
any positive requirement of the law, any principle of public policy, or an express
contract whether oral or written, nor to give to plain and unambiguous words or
phrases a meaning different from their natural import; and-it is, therefore, inadmissible to show that a stipulafion in a contract of hiring, that the hirer was to
1 28 Ala. Rep., N. S. 704. We are indebted to the learned reporter for this case.-
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"lose the negro's lost time," "related to time lost by sickness or running away,
and not to time lost in consequence of the negro's death."
8. GeneralolVection to evidence.-If evidence is offered as a wh'ole, when a portion of
it is illegal, the court may, on objection, exclude the whole of it.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mobile.
Tried before the Hon. C. W. Rapier.
This action was brought by Andrew Lambert against Robert
Barlow and Uriah Barlow, and was founded on the defendants'
promissory note for $175, dated January 1, 1853, and payable
twelve months after date. The pleas were, a tender before suit
brought, and the general issue, with leave to give any special matter in evidence as a bar to the suit. It was proved on the trial,
that the note was given for the hire of a slave; and the witness who
testified to the contract of hiring, one J. F. Boyles, stated, that at
the time the contract was made, and before the note was executed,
"plaintiff told defendant that he (defendant) would have to lose the.
negro's lost time, without specifying how that lost time might
occur,-whether by death or -otherwise; and that the defendant
agreed to it,-saying that he would lose that time of course." The
defendants§offered two witnesses, "to prove that the words, 'lose
the negro's lost time,' as used in the contract of hiring to which
Boyles testified, had a general and well understood meaning'.in Baldwin county, where said contract was entered into; and they related
to time lost by sickness or running away, and not time lost in consequence of the negro's death. They also. offered evidence to prove
a general and well known custom in said county, where a hired
negro died during the year for which he was hired, for the owner to
deduct all time from the period of the negro's death; which testimony the court ruled inadmissible, and the defendants excepted.
The defendants also proved, that said negro died, during the year,
without their fault. The court charged the jury, that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover the full amount of the note, with interest,
unless.they believed from the evidence that plaintiff, when he hired said
negro, agreed to make an abatement for the time lost by the negro
in case he should die before the expiration of the year."
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Win. 9. Jones and Bobt. B. Armistead, for the appellant.
im. Boyles, contra:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SToNE,

J.-The constitution of the State of Alabama (Art. II,

§ 1) declares, that "the powers of the government of the State of
Alabama shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each
of them confided to a separate body of magistracy-to wit: those
which are legislative to one; those which are executive to another;
and those which are judicial to another." The first section of the
third article contains this language: "The legislative power in this
State shall be vested in * * * the general assembly of the
State of Alabama." By the "schedule" attached to the constitution of the State, (§ 5,) the "territorial laws, not repugnant to the
constitution," were continued of force.
The acts of 1828 and 1832, (Clay's Digest, §§ 11, 17,) adopted
the rules of the law merchant, as to days of grace, demand, protest,
and notice, so far as the same affect bills of exchange, and bonds
and other instruments payable in bank. The Code (1525, 1526
adopts the "commercial law," as governing the same classes of instruments, with provisions somewhat variant.
. The Code superseded all the "acts of a public nature, theretofore
passed," and which were "designed to operate on all the people of
the State, not-embraced in said Code ;" except that the acts of the
legislature passed at the session of 1851-2, whether approved before
or after the adoption of the Code, "but such laws supersede any
provision of the Code with which they conflict."-Code §§ 11, 12.
In Cawood's case, 2 Stew. 360, this court held, that under the
2d article of the ordinance of 1787, "which was afterwards made
the fundamental law of" this territory, "the common law of England, so far as applicable," was made a rule of action for our government, " both in civil and criminal cases." By a series of decisions,
running through our entire judicial history, the above doctrine has
been firmly established; and it must now be admitted, that the common law, qualified as above, is part and parcel of the law of this
State.
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We believe we have thus exhibited the sources, organic and
written, from which our rules of action are mainly derived. The
constitution, in the distribution of the "powers of the government,"
having conferred the "legislative power" on the " general assembly,'" the question may arise, under what authority, by what warrant, are we brought under the dominion of other rules of action ?
Is it sound, is it consistent with the genius of our government, that
any portion of the community less than the whole-any city, town,
village, or neighborhood-shall exercise powers which the constitution has conferred alone on the general assembly ? Shall such
" portion of the community" make unto themselves a law which
shall overrule the general law ? It becomes us to feel our way cautiously, lest there grow up in our midst some third estate, which
shall, in time, usurp the government.
While we are not prepaked to say that "customs," or " usages,"
for certain purposes, and under certain restrictions, may not, and
do not, rightfully exist, we own ourselves "no friends to the almost
indiscriminate habit, of late years, of setting up usages, or customs,
in almost all kinds of business or trade, to control, vary, or annul
the general liabilities of parties under the common law, as well* as
under the commercial law." The Schooner Reeside, 2 Sumner,
567.
Like most other subjects, on which the minds' of men differ, the
decisions of the courts, defining what usage or custom may or may
not do, have been far from uniform. Much confusion and inaccuracy have crept ifito the adjudged cases, so that any attempt to reconcile them would necessarily prove abortive. Custom, long acquiesced in, and sanctioned by judicial decision, has given us the systems of laws known as the common law and the law merchant.
These systems are judicially taken notice of, and are not subject of
proof. Hogan vs. Beynolds, 8 Ald. 50. These systems, then,
may be declared to have obtained the dignity of law. Local customs, or particular usages, can claim no such eminence. They are
They
not, and cannot become, a rule of action "prescribed."
never assume a character so binding, as that parties cannot, by
agreement, place their contracts without their influence. So, when
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custom and contract- come in conflictl the latter prevails over the
former. They are, at most, but a part and parcel of the contract,the subject of proof like other facts,-and are only binding, becfuse
they are part of the contract. Not that the proof in each case
shows that the parties, in fact, incorporated the custom into their
contract; but that by the testimony, it is shown that the particular
custom is so general and so known, as to raise the inference that
the parties knew of its existence, and contracted with reference to
it. It is, in effect, nothing more than one means of establishing a
material fact; a case of presumptive evidence. The fact to be
established is, that a certain element or stipulation entered into the
contract or agreement of the parties. That element or stipulation
was either not expressed in the contract, or, if expressed, the parties either cannot, or do not, offer proof of the direct fact. In
such case, the rule declares that proof may be made of the local
custom or usage, in order that from its existence the supposed element or stipulation may be safely and satisfactorily deemed to be
incorporated into the 6ontract. If the proof fail to raise this inference, it should be regarded as insufficient. When custom has been
sufficiently proved, it becomes a part of the contract, not the law of
the case. Jones vs. 1?ales, 4 Mass. 252; Halsey vs. Brown, 8 Day,
346.
It follows from what is said above, that custom cannot overturn
the positive requirements of the law, or the express contracts of
the parties, whether the contracts be evidenced by writings or not.
Benner vs. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 587. Neither can custom contravene any principle of public policy. Snowden vs. Warder, 3 Rawle, 107; Dunham vs. Day, 18 Johns. 44; Gallatin vs.
Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209; Williams vs. Gillman, 3 Greenl. 281;
Waters vs. Lilly, 4 Pick. 145.
Evidence of custom cannot be received, to give to plain and unambiguous words or phrases a meaning different from their natural
import. Schooner _eeside, 2 Sum. 567; Turney vs. Wilson, 7
Yerg. 840; Ivey vs. Phifer, 13 Ala. 824. This principle rests on
a sound public policy. Oral evidence cannot be given to vary or
contradict, enlarge or qualify a written contract, or to prove that
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the parties intended differently from the legal import of their language, although witnesses may testify, directly and positively, to
such different intention. Neither can such result be attained indirectly, by proof that a local custom exists, and has become so known
and general, that parties are presumed to have contracted -with reference to it, and thus made the custom a part of their agreement.
The former is an offer to make direct proof of an inadmissible fact;
the latter, an effort to prove circumstances, or facts, from which to
infer the fact, which, when offered directly, is inadmissible. The
statement of such a proposition is its refutation.
We hold, then, that proof of custom may be received, to supply
the details of a contract, either written or oral, where the contract
is silent in its details, unless such custom contravene the positive
requirements of the.law, or some principle of _public policy. The
Schooner vs. Reeside, 2 Sumner, supra; Jones vs. .Fales,4 Mass.
245; .Rankin vs. Amer. Ins. Co., 1 Hall, 619; Gibson vs. Cuyler,
.17 Wend. 305 ; Ala. & Tenn. Rivers Railroad Company vs. Kidd,
and P'artridgevs. For8sythe, at the present term.
It may also safely be laid down, that where by local custom, or
usage, provincialisms, and technicalities of science and commerce,
and perhaps some others, have acquired a known, fixed, and definite meaning, different from their ordinary imnport; or, where such
technicalities, unexplained,, are susceptible of two or more plain and
reasonable constructions, it is certainly competent to prove the existence of such custom, as a means of showing the sense in which
the contracting parties intended to be understood. Murray vs.
.atch, 6 Mass. 465; Winthrop vs. Union Ins. Co., 2 Wash. Cir.
Ct. 10 ; Sleght vs. Rhinelander, 1 Johns. 192 ; Boorman vs. Johnson, 12 Wiend. 572; Cowen & Hill's Notes to Phil. Ev. 8 vol. p.
1409; Barger vs. Caldwell, 2 Dana, 180.
We are aware that, in some adjudged cases, principle5 are asserted
in conflict with some of the rules expressed above. The same remark may be predicated of some loose dieta found in other cases,
and some of the elementary writers. Of this class are the following: 1M1iddletan vs. .eyward, 2 Nott & Me. 9; Bank vs. Paige,
9 Mass. 155; tomer vs. Dorr, 10 Mass. 26 ; Bouv. L. D., " Cus-
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tom," and cases cited; United States vs. McDaniel, 7 Peters, 15;
Coit vs. Cor. 1ns. Co., 7 Johns. 385; Boorman vs. Johnson, 12
Wend. 572; Smith vs. Wilson, 3 Barn. & Adol. 728; Cutler vs.
Powell, 6 T. R. 320. A dictum in Price vs. White, 9 Ala. 563,
is perhaps obnoxious to this criticism.
The words testified to by the witness Boyles, as a part of the
contract of. hiring, that the hirer was to "lose the negro's lost
time," are plain and unambiguous. They have but one legitimate
meaning, and it was not permissible to give to them a different
meaning, either by direct or indirect proof, as was proposed in this
case. If the contract had been silent on the matter of the negro's
lost time, we do not say that the alleged local custom of Baldwin
county, was not a legitimate subject of proof, if offered alone. It
was not so offered, and we need not now decide that question.
There is no error in the record, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

In Chancery, New Jersey, May Term, 185&
JOHNSON VS. HUBBELL ET AL.

1. A person may make an agreement, which will bind him legally, to make a.
particular disposition of his property by last will.
2. A court of equity will decree the specific performance of such an agreement
upon the principles which govern the'court, in the exercise of this branch of its.
jurisdiction.
3. Although the agreement is by parol, if there is a part performance of such a

character as, upon the principles recognized by the court, will take a parol
agreement out of the statute of frauds, then there is nothing peculiar about aa

agreement of this hind to exclude it from the operation of those principles.
4. If one party to a parol agreement has wholly or partially performed it on his.

part, so that its non-falfllment bythe other party is a fraud, the court will compel a performance.

6. Although a party has a right to the protection of the court, if that protection
cannot be given him without invading the rights of innccent parties, its aid will
be refused.
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John T. Nixon and William L. Dayton, for complainant.
A. Sinneckson, J. T. Randolph and A. Browning, for defendants.
WILLIAMSON, Chancellor.-Hanniah Johnson, the mother of the

complainant, died in the year 1811. At the time of her marriage
with the complainant's father, Robert Johnson, she was seised, and
possessed, of a very large and valuable estate in the County of
Salem. During the coverture, she joined with her husband in the
sale and conveyance of a part of this estate for the consideration
of twenty thousand dollars, which consideration was received by
her husband, and by him expended in the improvement of real
estate which he held in his own right. At her death, the value of
the real estate which Hannah Johnson left was about eighty thou-sand dollars." She left two children who inherited this estate-the
,complainant-and his sister, Anna G. Hubbell, one of the defendants
to this suit. By the, then existing laws of this State regulating
descents, the complainant was entitled to two-thirds, and his sister
to one third of the estate, which they inherited from their mother.
Robert Johnson, the father, being tenant by the curtesy, was in the
Ipossession of the real estate of his wife, and received the rents and
1profits up to the time of his death in 1850. Before the complainant
-came of age, his father complained to him of the inequality of
the disposition made by the law, of his mother's estate, and-expressed
to him his wishes, that when his son should arrive at age, he would
divide his mother's property equally with his sister; and his father
said to 'his son, if he would make such equal division, he would
leave 'his estate equally between his two children, and that if his
son did not so divide it, then he would feel constrained to make by
will, an unequal division of his own estate, between his son and
daughter, and leave the larger portion to his daughter. The daughter was present at this time, and expressed her concurrence in the
views of her father.
-Shortly after the complainant came of age, the father took his
two children into his private office, and there produced and laid
before them, the title papers and maps of their mother's estate, and
also of his own real estate, and explained to them the location and
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value of the respective portions, and urged the complainant to
divide equally with his sister their mother's estate. The father
then agreed and promised, in the presence of his daughter, that
if his son would execute the necessary deeds, for an equal partition of the mother's estate, that he would leave all his own
property equally to his two children, share and share alike. He at
the same .time declared, that if his son refused to comply with his
wishes, that he would leave his estate to his daughter, and that
would make her share in both estates more than equal to his son's.
In consideration of the promise and agreement, so made by his
father, the son agreed that an equal division of his mother's estate
should be made *between himself and sister, and that the father
should make the division so agreed upon.
To carry out the agreement, deeds were drawn and prepared,
under the direction of the father. After the papers were prepared,
he called his children again into his office, and remarked to the
officer, who was then.present to take the acknowledgments of the
deeds, that it was unnecessary to enter into a minute explanation,
of the character of the deeds, as his children knew all about them.
Mutual releases, between the son and daughter, were then executed
to complete the division. These papers were cxecuted, and bear.
date the 1st of September 1883.
On the 12th of October, 1886, Anna G. Hubbell, conveyed to her
father a part of the land which, in the division, was released to her
by the complainant, and known by the name of the "Guinea farm."
The consideration expressed in the deed was $20,000.
On the 20th of April, 1850, Robert Johnson made his last will,
by which he entirely cut off, and excluded his son, from all right
and participation in his estate therein devised. As to the "Guinea
farm," he died intestate.

All the rest of his property, which was

a very large and valuable real estate, he disposed of by his will.
A very large portion of it he devised to his daughter for life, and
at her death to her three children in fee simple; or, in case of their
death, to other devisees named in the will. The residue of his real
estate mentioned in the will, the testator devised to his two nephews,
Thomas and Andrew Sinneckson.
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Robert G. Johnson died in October, 1850; and the devisees are in
possession under the will.
These are the facts stated in the bill. The bill is demurred to,
and these facts must be taken as true. The bill prays that the
agreement, between the complainant and the said Robert G. Johnson, may be specifically performed and carried into execution by
the defendant, and they be decreed to convey to the complainant
the equal one-half part of the estate of the said Robert G. Johnson;
or, if it should be deemed more equitable and just, that the said
Anna G. Eubbell be decreed to re-convey to the complainant the
land which she received from the complainant as the considerationfor the performance of his part of the said agreement.
There can be no doubt, but that a person may make a valid agreement, binding himself legally to make a particular disposition of his
property by last will and testament. The law -permits a man to
dispose of his own property at his pleasure; and no good reason
can be assigned, why he may not make a legal agreement to dispose
of his property to a particular individual, or for a particular purpose,
as well by will, as by a conveyance to be made at some specified
future period, or upon the happening of some future event. It may
be unwise for a man, in this way to embarrass himself as to the final'
disposition of his property, but he is the disposbr, by law, of his
own fortune, and the sole and best judge as to the time and manner of disposing of- it. A court of equity will decree the specific

performance of such an agreement, upon the recognized principles
by-which it is governed in the exercise of this branch of its jurisdic-

tion.. In the case of Bivers against the .Executors of Rivers,
3 Dessau. Rep. 195, the court, in sustaining the propriety of a court
of equity's recognizing and enforcing such an agreement, very

properly remarked that a man might renounce every power, benefit,
or right,.whichthe laws give him, and he will be bound by his asreement to do so, provided the agreementbe entered into fairly, sqithout
surprise,.imposition, or fraud,and that it be reasonable and moral.
In Izard vs. Mzecutors of lTard, 1 Dessau. Rep. 116, there is a
note to the case, in which most of the old authorities bear'ng upon
this subject are collected. There are two classes of &horitie
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there collected; one of' which relates to the subject of agreements,
by two parties, to make mutual wills in favor of each other, on
certain contingencies; and the other, in which courts of equity have
decreed the specific performance of agreements connected with
testamentary, or other settlements. In addition to the cases cited
in this note, I would refer to the case of L. Walpole vs. L. Oxford,
3 Yes. 402; and the same case, in 7 . & E. 138, and Lewis vs.
Madocks, 6 res. 150; Fortescue vs. .annah, 19 Yes. 71, and a
note to Randall vs. Willis, 5 Yes. 866, in which a report of the
case of Jones and wife vs. Martin, in 8 Amb. 882, is given at
length, Podmore vs. Gunning, 9 Sim. 644, Morehouse vs. Colvin,
9 0. L. & E. Rep. 186.
The case of Jones and wife vs. Martin, was this: By articles
executed upon the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Jones, the father of Mrs.
Jones covenanted to leave her upon his death certain tenements;
and that he would at his decease, by his will, give and leave her a
full and eqiual share with her brother and sister of all his personal
estate, to be held and enjoyed immediately after the decease of
himself and his wife and not before. The father, for the purpose
of defeating the articles of settlement, conveyed a large part of his
property, consisting of East India stock, to his son. On appeal, it
was decreed, that the stock and dividends were subject to the covenants.
In the case of Fortescue vs. Hannah, 19 Yes. 66, it was determined, that where a father, by indenture, covenants for an equal.
division, at his death, of all the property he should die seised or
possessed of between his two daughters or their families, though he
retains the power of free disposition by act in his life, cannot defeat
the covenant by a disposition in effect testamentary, as by reserving
to himself an interest for life. Following the principles established
by these authorities, it was decided in the case of Rivers vs. Rivers'
Executors, before referred to, that where a woman about to marry a
man, had agreed in writing to renounce all claims on his estate, on
his agreeing to make adequate provision for her, and had made
provision for her, by will, and died, that the court would see the
agreement executed, by enlarging the provision, if, in the opinion
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of the court, it was not an adequate provision, in proportion to the
estate. The authority of all these cases has recently been very
fully recognized in the. House of Lords, in the case of Logan vs.
Wienholt, 7 Blight R. 58, 54, and the substance of which is given
as follows, in 2 Story's Eq. § 786.
"If a person covenants, or agrees, or in any other manner validly
binds himself to give to A, by his will, as much property as he gives
to any other child, he may put it out of his power to do so, by
giving away all his property in his lifetime. Or, if he binds himself to give to A as much as he gives to B, by his will,. he may, in
his lifetime, give to B, what he pleases, so as, by his will, he shall'
give to A as much as he gives to B. But then the gifts which he
makes in his lifetime to B, must be out and out, for if, to defraud
or defeat the obligation which he has thus entered into, he gives to
B any property, real or personal, over which he.retains a control,
or in which he reserves an interest to himself; then, in order to
protect the agreement or obligation, and to prevent his escaping,
as it were, from his own contract, courts of equity will treat this
gift to B in the same manner as if it were purely -testamentary,
and were included in a will; and the subject matter of the gift will
be brought back, and made the fund out of which to perform the
obligation. At all events, it will be made the measure for calculating and ordering the performance of, and dealing with the claim
arising under the agreement or obligation."
This agreement then, made between the complainant and his
father, was a legal agreement; and this court should decree its
execution, if, in the exercise of its legal discretion, it can do it
without violating any principle'of equity, or doing injustice to any
third party who has innocently become invglved in the transaction.
Generally the agreement may be enforced without any embarrassment. If A, enters into an agreement with B, for which he receives
a good consideration, to give him his property by will, and in violation of his agreement, he gives it by his will to C, the court will
declare C a trustee for B. In doing this it does C no. wrong. A
having undertaken to make to C a voluntary gift of that which be
had no right in law so to dispose of, the court does C no injustice,
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and violates none of. his rights, by declaring him a mere trustee.
To permit C to hold the property as against B, the court would
sanction the fraud which A had committed in disposing of the
property in violation of his agreement.
Several objections are made to the court's decreeing a specific
performance in this case, in addition to the general one which I
have considered.
It is said that this agreement was in paro], and is therefore con.trary to the statute of frauds. But although this agreement was
a mere parol one, if there was a part performance of it of such a
character as, upon the principles recognized and acted upon by this
court, will take a parol agreement out of the statute, then there is
nothing peculiar about an agreement of this kind to exclude it from
the operation of those principles. If one party to a parol agreement has wholly or partially'performed it on his part, so that its
non-fulfilment by the other party is a fraud, the court will compel
a performance. In this case the son performed his part of the
agreement. He paid-a valuable consideration and parted with his
property. In fact .everything was done and performed by both
parties that the character of the transaction would admit of. The
part of the agreement which the son was to perform was to be performed in praesenti, and that part to be performed by the father,
was to be performed infuturo. There is no uncertainty about the
agreement in the slightest respect. It is definite and certain in
every particular. It is specifically set out by the complainant in
his bill, and the agreement as alleged, is admitted by the demurrer.
There is no objection to a decree on the ground of the contract not
being in writing.
It was again objected, that the peculiar character of the contract
is such, as should induce a court of equity to refuse its aid in carrying it into execution-that it was a mere promise made by a
father to his son, and ought not to be looked upon as a binding
agreement; and that it is bad policy for the court to recognize an
agreement made between a father and son, that the father will
devise to his son the whole, or any considerable part of his property-that such an agreement has a tendency to destroy that
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mutual relationship which ought to exist between father and son,
and should not therefore be sanctioned by a court of equity. I do
not consider the agreement in question objectionable upon any of
these considerations. It cannot be regarded as a mere promise,
which the son relied upon as such, and trusting alone to the honor
and word of his father. Here was the son just of age, the owner
of a large and very valuable property, which he inherited from his
mother. There were but two children; and the father was himself
possessed of a large estate. He was desirous of afamily arrangement with regard to both estates. He pressed the propriety of it
upon his son while he was yet in his minority, and under his parent's
control. He solicited and insisted upon the arrangement, after his
son arrived of age; and he enforced his wishes and parental
authority, by declaring to his son, that if he refused to make the
arrangement he should be disinherited, and cut of from all share in
his father's estate. He fixed the terms of the agreement himself.
He requires of his son, as his part of the agreement to be performed,
that in this family arrangement he shall part with one-sixth of his
estate. An agreement, or family arrangement like this is favored
in a court of equity. Marriage settlements, and agreements for
family arrangements with respect to property, are viewed with favor
by this court. They ought to be respected, and scrupulously carried out by the parties to them; and if they are not, a court of
equity ought to enforce their execution. Does it not present a case
for the favorable consideration of a court of equity, where a son
arriving of age, entitled in his own right to a large estate, obedient
to parental authority, enters into a family arrangement with his
father, at the father's request, by which he parts with a valuable
portion of his inheritance, and that son afterwards without any
reason is disinherited- by his father, comes into a court of equity
to ask that the family arrangement may be carried into execution ?
As far as the circumstances of that arrangement are before the
court, it appears to have been an equitable one and perfectly
proper, and that gross injustice has been done to the complainant,
by his father's refusing to comply with his agreement, and to carry
out fairly the family arrangeinent, which was made at his solicita-
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tion, accompanied with all the persuasion and influence of parental
authority. The complainant is certainly entitled to some relief;
and if there is any insurmountable difficulty in decreeing the agreement to be specifically performed, the court will endeavor to give
him relief in some other shape.
There are difficulties in the way of enforcing the performance of
this agreement specifically, which appear to me to be insurmountable. The complainant has a right to the protection of this court,
and to its aid in establishing and enforcing his rights; but if that
protection and aid cannot be afforded him without invading and disregarding the rights of others, this court may not, in its anxiety and
desire to relieve one party, inflict a wrong and injury upon another,
-entirely innocent in the transaction.
The agreement on the part of the father was, that he would leave
all his property equally between his two children, the complainant
and his sister. The father has violated his agreement as to both,
and has disappointed the expectations as well of his daughter as of
the complainant, his son. But it is manifest that this court cannot
decree the daughter entitled to one-half of the property. She was
no such party to the agreement as to entitle her to have it specifically performed for her benefit. She agreed to nothing on her
part-there was nothing on her part to be performed. She received
the consideration which her father exacted for his part of the agreement. She was benefited and not injured by the agreement as far
as it was performed.
Suppose the court should declare that the complainant has an
attaching equitable trust in the testator's estate, in the hands of the
devisees under the will, and is entitled to one-half of that estate ?
Of such a decree, the grand-children or nephews, who are devisees,
would have no right to complain, because what the testator devised
to them he had no right so to dispose of. He had agreed to dispose of it otherwise, and the party to that agreement claims the
benefit of it. But not so with Airs. Hubbell. By the agreement
she was to have one equal part of the estate with her brother. She
has been disappointed as well as he in her expectations, and she has
only a life estate in part, instead of a fee simple in one-half the
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property. How can I carve out of this estate, devised as it is,.the
portion which the complainant claims without doing an injury and
injustice to Mrs. Hubbell. Mrs. Hubbell is not in any way responsible for the will of her father. It is not alleged that she controlled
him, or endeavored to control him, in making his will. She is an
innocent party, and entitled as much to the protection of the court
as the complainant. Suppose I was to take out of this estate one-half
for the complainant? I could not alter the character of the estate,
which the devisees have under the will, to the other half. Mrs.
Hubbell then would necessarily have a life estate only in a little
more than one-half of what is given her by the will; and yet retaining all the will gives her, it is not equal to the absolute property
in one-half of the estate, which, if the agreement had been performed, she would have been entitled to.
Now, although the agreement upon which the bill is filed is a
legal one, it does not follow that a Court of Chancery will decree
its specific performance. It is not a matter of right in either party
that the court should make such a decree ; but it is a matter of discretion in the court, which withholds or grants relief according to
the circumstances of each particular case, when the general rules
and principles which govern the court will not furnish any exact
measure of justice between the parties. 2 Story's Eq. Jur. 742.
Courts of equity will not enforce the specific performance of a contract at the instance of a vendor, where his title is involved in difficulties which cannot be removed, although it may be a case where,
at law, any action may be maintained for damages; or in a case
where the character and condition of the property, to which the
contract is attached, have been so altered, that the terms and restrictions of it are no longer applicable to the existing state of
things; or in cases where, from a change of circumstances or otherwise, it would be unconscientious to enforce it. The proposition
may be more generally stated: that courts of equity will not interfere to decree a specific performance, except in cases where it would
be strictly equitable to make such a decree. 2 Story's Eq. Jur.
§749, 750, and notes.
In this case, the situation of the property to which the contract
is attached, is such, and the rights of third parties are so involved
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in the subject matter of the controversy, as to render it extremely
embarrassing and difficult to carry into effect a decree for specific
performance. I arrive at this conclusion with less reluctance than I
otherwise should from the consideration that the complainant is not
remediless in the premises.
The consideration of the agreement, on the part of the complainant, was that he should convey to his sister one-sixth part of his
inheritance which he had received from his mother. Mrs. Hubbell
was present when the arrangement was made. It was a family arrangement, made between the father, son and daughter. The daughter assented to it, and to carry out the family compact, she accepted
from her brother a conveyance of the land, which was the performance of his part of the contract. She accepted it upon the terms
of the agreement, which terms, if faithfully carried out would have
conferred additional benefits upon herself as well as her brother.
The family arrangement has not been carried out; and it is against
equity and good conscience that the sister should continue in the
enjoyment of her brother's land without compensation or satisfaction. This the court can restore to the complainant.
There are several objections interposed to this form of relief. It
is said no fraud. is imputed to any of the parties at the time of
making the agreement, and no fraud is alleged to have been committed by Mrs. Hubbell since; that Mrs. Hubbell made no promise
which was to be fulfilled on her part; and that she is not responsible for the non-fulfillment of the agreement by her father.
The fraud of the father was in not making his will and dividing
his estate between his children, after having induced his son to part
with a portion of his inheritance, relying upon his father's promise
that he would make such will; and it does not deprive the breach,
or non-fulfillment of the contract, of its fraudulent character, because the fraud was not meditated at the time the agreement was
made. The fraud of the daughter is, in retaining her brother's
land without consideration,which is against good-conscience; and
it is to protect the complainant against such fraud, that this mode
of relief is proper. That Mrs. Hubbell made no agreement or promise with her brother, that she wofild be resposible that the contract

